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Abstract
With the proliferation of wireless networks, mobile
devices and medical devices are increasingly being
equipped with wireless interfaces, such as Bluetooth and
WiFi to allow easy access to and control of the medical
devices. Unfortunately, the very presence and usage of
such interfaces also expose the medical devices to novel
attacks from malicious parties. The emerging threat from
malicious mobile devices is significant and severe, since
attackers can steal confidential data from a patient’s med-
ical device. Also, attackers can compromise the medi-
cal device and either feed doctors bad data from it or is-
sue potentially fatal commands to the device, which may
even result in the death of the patient. As the mobile de-
vices are often at close proximity to the patient (either in
the hospital or home settings), attacks from such devices
are hard to prevent. In this paper, we present a systematic
analysis of this new threat from mobile devices on med-
ical devices and healthcare infrastructure. We also per-
form a thorough security analysis of a major hospital and
uncover potential vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose a
set of potential solutions and defenses against such at-
tacks.
1 Introduction
In recent years, medical devices are increasingly be-
ing equipped with wireless communication interfaces
for better monitoring and controlling of patient’s health.
Infusion pumps, patient monitors, electrocardiograms,
portable CAT machines, pulse oximeter sensors, heart
rate monitors, pacemakers, breathing sensors, cardiac de-
fibrillators, activity sensors, and insulin pumps are some
examples of medical devices which have Bluetooth or
WiFi access. Some of these devices are wearable, while
some of them are implantable. According to ABI re-
search, the market of wearable wireless devices will
grow up to US$400 million by 2014 [2]. According to
a study by the Freedonia Group, demand for Implantable
medical devices (IMD) in the United States will increase
7.7% annually and will grow to a US$52 billion market
by 2015 [16]. Besides that, smart mobile devices, such
as, smart phones or tablets are also getting ubiquitous
very rapidly which have the capability to communicate
with wireless medical devices through the Bluetooth or
WiFi channel. Leijdekkers et al. showed that it is pos-
sible to create a personal heart monitoring and rehabil-
itation system using smart phones [25]. This capability
facilitates the growth of healthcare applications on smart
mobile devices. Another ABI research report says that
smart phone health applications will exceed US$400 mil-
lion annually by 2016 [3]. The proliferation of wireless
enabled mobile devices and medical devices has blessed
our everyday life as well as the healthcare facility.
However, adversaries can misuse these Bluetooth and
WiFi channels on mobile devices to launch novel attacks
on medical devices. An attacker can get access to the
patient’s electronic medical record (EMR) by sniffing on
the communication channel. She can also launch active
attacks – for example, remotely issue a command for
lethal doses on an insulin pump, or send stop command
to an implantable pacemaker. The presence of mobile
devices inside the security perimeter of the medical net-
work makes them an attractive attack vector. Rather than
being in close proximity to the patient, an attacker can
launch an attack by proxy through a malware-infected
mobile device belonging to the patient, a physician, or
visitors. The attacker can also trigger attacks at spe-
cific time to have the most impact on the patient or her
medical devices. In many cases, people who are using
wearable or implantable medical devices use their smart
phones to monitor their health conditions. As people
tend to keep their smartphones with them almost all the
time [30], there is high chance that a mobile malware can
monitor the patient’s condition 24x7. Through the mo-
bile malware, an attacker can also target a specific group
of people or a specific medical facility. Attacks from mo-
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bile devices, therefore, are significant and carry a greater
risk to patient safety.
Unfortunately, it is hard to block the malware from
using the network as many of these devices are already
authenticated and authorized to use the required net-
work. By the time we identify that the anomaly in
medical device is due to a malware-infected mobile
device, it may be too late to prevent the damage to
patient health. Moreover, the resource limitation in both
mobile and medical devices is the most pivotal hurdle in
making these devices secured. Due to the computational
and battery limitations, we can neither use traditional
anti-malware software in medical and mobile devices,
nor use strong encryption scheme for communication.
Researchers have previously explored some attacks on
medical devices and proposed network security solu-
tions. But, attacks from mobile malware have not been
fully explored yet and the schemes to secure traditional
network communication are not always applicable to
low-powered medical devices. And most importantly,
the existing network security schemes do not consider
insider attacks from compromised devices, where the
enemy is already inside the secured region. In this
paper, we explore a set of active and passive attacks on
medical devices from an entirely novel medium – smart
mobile devices. We identify the attack surface, perform
a real-life case study, and explore mitigation strategies
against these threats.
Contributions: The contributions of this paper are as
follows:
1. We provide a systematic analysis of the threats from
mobile devices to medical devices and infrastruc-
ture to identify vulnerabilities in current medical de-
vice usage models.
2. We perform a case study in a large hospital environ-
ment and identify vulnerabilities.
3. We explore mitigation strategies for securing medi-
cal devices against such attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides the background and motivation of our work
and presents our threat model. Section 3 describes the
possible threats. In section 4, we state one case study
and in section 5, we provide some solutions to prevent
these attacks. Section 6 reviews prior works, relevant to
our research and we discuss future work and conclusion
in Section 7.
2 Motivation and Threat Model
In this section, we present our motivation for exploring
possible threats from smart mobile devices to new
generation Bluetooth or WiFi-enabled medical devices.
We also discuss the threat model.
2.1 Motivation
While mobile malware and attacks on medical devices
are not new phenomena, the combination of these two
things can be devastating. Availability of WiFi and
Bluetooth has made mobile devices more powerful than
they ever were. However, at the same time, this has
also increased the risks of new ways of attacks. Bot-
net command-and-control networks have used Bluetooth
as a communication medium [36]. Android phones can
also be used to exploit Bluetooth interface to hack into
a car’s Electronic Control Unit [12]. A lot of other at-
tacks from smart phones are stated by Guo et al. [18].
Medical devices are also not safe from various kinds of
attacks. It is possible to launch a software radio attack on
implantable cardiac defibrillators and pacemakers [20].
Devices, such as, insulin pumps and glucose meters have
also been successfully hacked [10, 27].
As both smart mobile devices and medical devices
are now equipped with Bluetooth and WiFi interfaces,
attackers can launch attacks on medical devices from
compromised mobile devices. The consequence of
such attacks on medical devices ranges from threats
to the patients reputation to even her life. Sniffing
EMR from the communication channels can be highly
attractive to attackers because of the business value of
medical records. Some attacks, such as providing wrong
information to display devices or sending malicious
command to some Implantable Medical Devices (IMD)
or wearable devices, can actually place the patient’s life
in jeopardy. Murderers can use this as their killing tool
as it is quite impossible to investigate [17]. Moreover,
mobile malware based attack can open the opportunity
of launching localized attacks. For example, adversary
can target the topmost employees of an organization
and if they wear any WiFi Real Time Location Service
(RTLS) enabled device, she can monitor their location
continuously. Therefore, it is important to systematically
analyze the threats to medical devices from smart mobile
devices and develop mitigation strategies.
2.2 Threat Model
To illustrate our threat model, we rely on the Bring Your
Own Device (BYOD) model [7]. This model has at-
tracted the attention of corporate security researchers ex-
ploring the enterprise security problem space [6]. Mod-
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ern office managers let their employers bring their own
smart devices, such as, laptop, smart phone, tablet, etc..
The downside is that, an infected tablet or smart phone
belonging to an executive can easily enter the system
and the malware may thus be running inside the secu-
rity perimeter of the corporation. In a healthcare setting,
this will involve a mobile device belonging to a doctor,
patient or a visitor who is present inside a healthcare fa-
cility or a person’s house. Even if the patient is using
strong security for her computing infrastructure, the in-
fected device will likely be in the vicinity of the medical
device. We assume that these mobile devices have al-
ready been infected by malware. This is possible when
users download an untrusted application from the appli-
cation store [15]. It is also possible to embed a malware
in a trusted application or push a malware through an up-
date patch of an existing application.
Pairing mechanism in Bluetooth channel offers most
of the security of this channel. We assume that the
malware affected devices are already paired with the
Bluetooth-enabled medical device. This assumption is
fairly common in malware research since people usually
have many of their own mobile devices paired for their
convenience. For example, while hacking a car’s control
unit, Checkoway et al. used an Android phone which
was already paired with the car [12]. In the medical en-
vironment, this is more likely, where mobile devices be-
longing to healthcare personnel and/or patients are usu-
ally paired with the medical devices for their own interest
(for example, a mobile bloodpressure app paired with a
wearable blood pressure monitor). This assumption is
sufficient to launch a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. We
also assume that the attacker is capable of reverse engi-
neering the application protocol of the Bluetooth-enabled
medical devices. This can make her capable of learning
patient data as well as sending incorrect signal to medical
devices.
To attack through the WiFi channel, we assume that
the malware infected mobile devices are already con-
nected to the access point and the attacker can reverse
engineer the application protocol. These assumptions
are sufficient for DoS attack and to interfere the com-
munication between mobile devices and WiFi-enabled
medical devices.
3 Threat Taxonomy
We classify the threats into three main categories. Some
attacks violate the privacy and confidentiality of pa-
tient’s EMR, some break the integrity of communication
between sensor device and display device or control
device, while other attacks can affect the availability
of the communication channel and the sensor device.
Figure 1 illustrates some possible attacks on healthcare
devices from smart mobile devices
3.1 Privacy and Confidentiality
Nowadays, wireless medical devices are used to monitor
patients’ heart rate, activity, blood sugar, blood pressure
and many other physical conditions. Physicians and
patients can view these data from their smart mobile
devices. Some implantable devices are helping doctors
to monitor the patients condition remotely. Patients
smart devices can upload the EMR to a centralized
system, from where the physician get real-time infor-
mation about the patients current condition remotely.
According to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), these electronic medical
data are private and confidential to the patient. People
are also concerned about the privacy of their clinical
data [34]. According to National Committee on Vital
and Health Statistics (NCVHS), privacy means control
over the acquisition, uses, or disclosures of personally
identifiable health data, and confidentiality means
obligations of those who receive information to respect
the privacy interests of those to whom the data relate
[13]. Using smart mobile devices, an adversary can
exploit the available Bluetooth or WiFi channel to gain
unauthorized access to the EMR and thus can violate
privacy and confidentiality. Below are some possible
attacks on privacy and confidentiality, we have identified:
Breach of Medical Data: Adversary can steal some-
one’s medical data by Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
on WiFi or Bluetooth channel. MITM in both Bluetooth
and WiFi channel is well explored [19, 21]. If the sensor
device and the control/display do not use any encryption
or use weak encryption in their communications, then it
is possible for an adversary to eavesdrop and sniff med-
ical data. Stealing secret medical data and publishing it
publicly can be a real threat to celebrities who do not
want to disclose their physical problems.
We also note that the adversary need not be present
near the patient by herself. She can create a malware
which will collect data and upload it to her server. If
the mobile devices of the patient, physician, or patient’s
visitors have this malware, then she can get the data via
the malware. With numerous malware infected smart
devices, she can compile a large electronic medical
record database.
Location Tracking: WiFi RTLS system is also getting
popular day by day. This location tracking technology
has a tremendous effect in improving patient care,
reducing costs, improving physical security and man-
agement of inventory. However, a malware infected
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Figure 1: Attacks on Medical Devices from Smart Mobile Devices.
phone can gather the location of a patient if she uses a
location-tagged infusion pump. In the same way, the
location of medical personnel can be exposed if they
wear WiFi badges and their smart phones are infected
by a malware. As people always tend to keep their
smart phone with them, it is possible to track a persons
location 24x7 in this way.
Exposing Confidential Health Information: Someone
wearing a pacemaker or insulin pump may not want to
expose that she has heart disease or diabetics to other
people. But, if the devices have Bluetooth or WiFi
access, it is possible for some adversary to know about
the presence of these devices and thus know about the
health condition of the person. Every WiFi or Bluetooth
enabled device has a unique 48 bit MAC address which
is visible to packet sniffers. Among the 48 bits, the
first 24 bits are reserved for device manufacturer; it is
called Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI) [23].
And from this identifier, it is possible to identify device
type. For example, from the MAC address we can
distinguish between HTC EVO and HTC Hero, two
Android phones from HTC [40]. Hence, it is possible to
build a similar type classifier for medical devices. Then,
an adversary will be able to know about the presence of
any wearable and implantable device in a person’s body
or the surrounding environment.
3.2 Integrity
The communication channel between sensor device
and control devices must be secured enough to provide
data integrity. Otherwise, an adversary can come in
the middle and send incorrect signal to medical/mobile
devices. Below we describe some attacks which violate
the integrity of the communication channel:
Misleading Information: By reverse engineering the
application protocol, an adversary can use a smart phone
to communicate with sensor or display device and feed
incorrect data. So we can get incorrect blood pressure
or glucose reading due to a malware installed on our
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smart phone. Sufficiently plausible incorrect data can
lead doctors to take improper steps.
Malicious Command: A more dangerous attack will
be sending incorrect command to a sensor device. A
malware from patient’s or a visitor’s phone can send
wrong command to a wearable or implantable device. It
can be a life threatening attack, if the adversary is able to
send malicious command to a implantable defibrillator,
pacemaker or an infusion pump. For example, a malware
installed in a smart phone can send a command of lethal
dose to the patient’s insulin pump.
3.3 Availability
Availability is a critical issue for medical devices.
For some devices, such as, implantable pacemaker or
cardioverter defibrillators, a short unavailability can be
fatal to the patient. Here are some possible attacks on
the availability of the wireless medical devices:
Denial of Service: The WiFi channel is based on
IEEE802.11 [22] standard. It is well known that this
standard is prone to DoS attack [8, 29] and interception
[11]. Noubir et al. showed that the absence of error cor-
rection scheme has made the IEEE802.11 and Bluetooth
vulnerable to DoS attack [29] .
Through our experiments, we have confirmed that
it is possible to launch a DoS attack on the WiFi and
Bluetooth channel by Android phone. If we know the
external IP of a WiFi enabled device, then we can send
a burst of packet from an Android phone to that device.
Which in turn, can make that device unavailable for
a while. From that observation, we can say that it is
possible to make a medical device unavailable by using
a smart mobile device.
Battery exhaustion: Another potential attack on the
availability of medic devices is to drain out the battery
of a device by keeping the communication channel busy
continuously. Battery exhaustion or resource depletion
attack on mobile devices through Bluetooth and WiFi
channel is a real threat [28]. As new generation medical
devices and mobile devices have similar communication
channels, we predict that such attack on medical devices
will be more common.
3.4 Localized Targeted Attack
We also look into the possibility of localized targeted
attack from mobile devices. Such attacks can fall into
any of the three above types. Someone can target a
hospital to bring down their reputation by triggering
the malware whenever doctors or patients come to that
particular hospital. Attackers can also simultaneously
trigger many attacks at a given hospital or even different
areas of a city, causing many people requiring immedi-
ate medical attention at the same time and resulting in
delays in emergency response.
4 Case Study
To explore the current security state of typical medical
devices used in hospitals, we analyzed the system of
a large university healthcare facility. Our tests found
several vulnerabilities in the ongoing usage model for
medical devices.
Current Security Measures: We found two security
measures taken by the medical. Firstly, to avoid any
intrusion in WiFi network of medical devices, the
hospital maintains a separate WiFi network for medical
devices and users. Patient or medical personnel can not
use this WiFi network, dedicated for medical devices.
And secondly, to ensure the data security, for some
medical devices, Secured Socket Layer (SSL) is used
to communicate with the central patient monitoring or
EMR management system.
Vulnerabilities and Possible Attack Scenarios: Sepa-
rate WiFi network for medical devices and smart mobile
devices can secure the system against integrity violation,
but still it is possible to attack on privacy and availabil-
ity. Also, for personal health monitoring devices used at
a home or workplace setting outside healthcare facilities,
this precaution will be invalid since users need to con-
nect their mobile devices with the medical devices via
their home or work networks to observe their health con-
dition. Even in the hospital, we were able to sniff the
packets without connecting to the WiFi network. From
the broadcast packets, we got the MAC and IP address of
the surrounding devices and the wireless access points.
By masquerading the IP address, it is possible to launch
a DoS attack. The MAC address can also be used to iden-
tify device types and thereby infer the patient’s confiden-
tial illness.
We identified insecurity in general purpose pump-
ing machines, which communicate with the central pa-
tient monitoring system over the SSL through a gate-
way. They convey patients health condition to the cen-
tral monitoring system, which returns appropriate dose
of medicine to the pumping machines. Though it is not
possible to intrude into a SSL communication, it is still
prone to DoS attacks. Also, the gateway IP address was
hard-coded in the device and was detected by our packet
sniffer. Jamming this IP is possible which will make the
communication channel unavailable. We cannot prevent
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this without updating the firmware as the gateway IP ad-
dress is not configurable.
We also explored the vulnerabilities of medical de-
vices, which use WiFi but do not communicate over SSL.
One such machine is vital sign (body temperature, pulse
rate or heart rate, blood pressure, and respiratory rate)
monitor system. It communicates with the central EMR
system over WiFi, without using SSL, even though it car-
ries sensitive health information and Nurse’s login cre-
dentials. Nurses need to login to this device to send
information to the EMR system. As we were able to
get the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets from
the channel, we could potentially launch a MITM at-
tack by ARP spoofing to get all the data packets sent
for the EMR system [14]. That device supports both
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and WiFi Protected Ac-
cess 2 (WPA2) encryption scheme. We can compromise
the WEP encryption and get the actual EMR from this
channel [39]. Using some tools, such as Aircrack [1],
one can also learn about the patients’ EMR. Nurse’s lo-
gin credentials can be exposed in the same way, which
will be extremely dangerous for the whole EMR man-
agement system, since the adversary can gather anyone’s
confidential medical data by posing as a nurse.
Our brief analysis confirms our original arguments
regarding the safety of WiFi and Bluetooth enabled
medical devices. The vulnerabilities we exposed show
that such devices are prone to different types of attacks
from mobile malware.
5 Mitigation Strategies
We propose some possible mitigation strategies against
attacks from mobile devices. We identify three major
reasons for the vulnerabilities: weak anti-malware
defense in mobile devices, weak or no encryption and
message authentication used in the communication
channel, and finally, weak or no defense against DoS
attack in medical devices. Table 1 gives an overview
of attacks, consequences, and potential mitigation
strategies.
Defense against malware: If we can take strong
defense against malware in the mobile devices, the
possibility of attack will be certainly reduced to a great
extent. In our threat model, most of the attacks are from
malware-infected mobile devices. Without using a mal-
ware as a proxy, the adversary needs to be present inside
the Bluetooth or WiFi coverage area and also must be
paired or connected with the existing Bluetooth or WiFi
network. Hence, strong defense against malware will
reduce the attack surface and can help us to mitigate the
risk of attacks. Unfortunately, due to resource limitation
in mobile devices, traditional signature based malware
detection softwares are not efficient for these devices.
However, some cloud based anti-virus architectures have
been proposed [33] to overcome the power restriction.
Another approach of detecting mobile malware is
monitoring battery usage. When a malware is running
in a devices, it must consume some extra battery power.
Hence, an anomaly from normal battery usage can be
used to detect the presence of a malware [24].
Low powered strong encryption & authentica-
tion: The two recent incidents of medical device
hacking occurred due to an unencrypted communication
channel [10, 27]. Manufacturers often skip encryption
to minimize power consumption and cost. As many
medical devices are battery powered, we need to focus
on finding low power consuming strong encryption and
authentication schemes. For implantable devices, we
need more power efficient strategy because it is not pos-
sible to change the battery of these devices frequently.
Both Bluetooth and WiFi have their own encryption
scheme. However, researchers accomplished several
successful attacks on the WEP encryption scheme of
WiFi [4, 11, 39]. WPA2 is still considered as secured
encryption scheme for WiFi channel, but not all the
medical devices are using this encryption due to the
power constraint. All the pairing and authentication
process in Bluetooth is based on customized SAFER+
block cipher [26] that uses 128 bit key for current
Bluetooth standard. However, the heart of the encryption
is the PIN number, that is entered by the pairing devices,
and it is possible to crack this PIN [35].
Defense against DoS: Denial of Service (DoS) and
Resource Depletion (RD) attack can be very crucial in
health care system. There exists some solutions against
DoS attack in IEEE 802.11 network protocol [9, 29], but
it is still unexplored whether these solutions are feasible
for low-power medical devices.
Anomaly-based intrusion detection: For all the
attacks that we mentioned here, there must be some
unexpected communication between mobile and medical
devices. Such anomalous network usage can be used
by a intrusion detection module in the medical devices.
Again, power restriction will be an obstacle to run this
module continuously. We can choose a certain interval
or random interval to awaken it. For some devices,
such as, blood pressure monitor, we can let the threat
detection module run only when the user chooses to do
so. Before reading data from display devices, physicians
can run this module to make sure whether the data is
coming from the actual sensor device or a malware.
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Threat Consequence Mitigation Strategy
Sniffing confidential data from the
WiFi or Bluetooth communication
channel
Breach of confidential medical
record, patient location, and
health condition.
Strong low power consuming en-
cryption scheme and Network
anomaly based intrusion detection
Sending malicious command
from mobile devices to medical
devices.
A lethal dose to a insulin pump or
a stop command to a pacemaker,
killing the patient.
Low power strong authentication
scheme.
Sending misleading information
from the mobile devices to the dis-
play.
This will misguide the doctor to
take appropriate decision.
Low power strong authentication
scheme and Network anomaly
based intrusion detection.
Launching a DoS attack from mo-
bile devices making it unavailable.
Unavailability of critical medical
devices can be fatal.
Defense against DoS attack which
will be suitable for low power
medical devices.
Battery exhaustion attack by keep-
ing the communication channel
busy.
Can kill patients who use pace-
maker or defibrillators.
Network anomaly based intrusion
detection.
Table 1: Overview of threats from mobile device, consequences, and mitigation strategies
6 Related Work
Many researchers have explored the vulnerability of
wireless-enabled medical devices. Halperin et al. pre-
sented a software radio attack on pacemakers and im-
plantable cardiac defibrillators (ICD) [20]. The ICD was
designed to communicate in 175 kHz frequency with an
external application. They reverse engineered the ICD’s
protocols to launch attacks on integrity and confidential-
ity of data. They showed that the communication channel
was unencrypted, and it is possible to change the opera-
tion of the ICD. They also proved that a battery-powered
ICD can be kept busy continuously by an unauthenti-
cated device, which can eventually drain out the battery
power.
Radcliffe successfully hacked his own insulin pump
[27]. He showed that untraceable attacks against wire-
less insulin pumps, pacemakers and ICDs are possible
from half a mile away. As the transmissions were not en-
crypted, he was able to decipher the messages. He suc-
cessfully reverse engineered the application protocol. At
first, he successfully jammed the communication chan-
nel. Later, he gained full control over the insulin pump
and glucose meter. Researchers at McAfee Inc. also suc-
cessfully compromised an insulin pump [10], and were
able to find vulnerable insulin pumps and send lethal
doses from a distance of 300 feet.
These attacks were done by reverse engineering the ra-
dio channel, without any direct knowledge of the propri-
etary communication protocol. New generation medical
devices communicate over Bluetooth or WiFi channels.
The protocol standard of these technologies is open to
everyone. Also, Denial of Service attacks or packet sniff-
ing do not require any reverse engineering, which conse-
quently led the security researcher to be more aware of
the attack through these popular channels.
Paul et al. identified some security breaches of wire-
less insulin pump system and proposed mitigation strate-
gies against the threats [32]. They were also able to send
command from an unauthorized program [31]. Sorber
et al. examined the security of mobile health (mHealth)
systems in which personal mobile devices serve as a
gateway between the EMR management system and
medical sensor devices. They proposed an architecture,
Amulet, that will ensure privacy and security of mHealth
system [37]. Arney et al. described some active and pas-
sive attack model on Biomedical devices [5] over wire-
less channel. They focused on patient’s physical secu-
rity, clinical data security and privacy, and medical de-
vice security. They also identified some key challenges
for which the security of the medical devices is still a
nightmare. Goodman et al. examined the possibility of
homicide and extortion attacks by hacking implantable
medical devices [17]. He also pointed out the difficulty
of investigating this type of homicide cases.
We leverage this body of existing research in explor-
ing the threats to medical devices. The threats from
infected mobile devices to medical devices, the core
focus of this paper, has not been explored fully by
researchers. The closest research related to our work
is done by Sorber et al., who proposed a smart card
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based software security scheme for mobile applications
[38]. While their approach allows creating trustworthy
applications on mobile devices, they do not consider
what will happen if the malware itself is capable of
communicating with sensor devices. However, we have
already pointed out the strength of the smart devices as a
tool for hacking, such as hacking a car’s ECU by android
phone through the Bluetooth channel [12]. In this paper,
we take the first step in exploring the threats from mobile
malware to medical devices. Though no real attack has
not been yet recorded, we must explore this new threat
model to take some early defenses against real attacker.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
As mobile devices become smarter, the threats from
mobile malware to surrounding infrastructure also in-
creases. WiFi and Bluetooth interfaces enable seamless
communication between medical devices and other parts
of the healthcare infrastructure. However, this capabil-
ity has increased the attack surface of medical devices
and opens the possibility of novel attacks. We argue that
threats on medical devices from mobile devices, espe-
cially malware based attacks, are still unexplored, though
mobile malware is exploding.
In this paper, we explored the threat of attacks from
mobile devices to medical devices. We posit that the
intrinsic nature of mobile computing makes the problem
difficult: mobile devices are likely to be inside the se-
curity perimeter of the healthcare facility’s network, be
close to the patient, and can be used to launch localized
attacks. We also opine that the resource limitation in
both medical and mobile devices is one of the main
obstacles to defend against these attacks. To protect
vital medical devices from attacks, we need to explore
the problem domain deeply and develop effective and
low-cost solutions. In future research, our goal is to
build a proof-of-concept application on Android plat-
form which can be used to evaluate a medical network
for vulnerabilities. We also plan to build and test our
network anomaly based intrusion detection scheme to
detect attacks on medical devices.
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